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Judicial Review of the Facts in Informal
Rulemaking: A Proposed Standard
Administrative action based on predictions in areas of complex tech-
nology' is commonly undertaken through informal rulemaking. Re-
cently courts have been uncertain about the proper degree of scrutiny
in reviewing the factual basis of such actions.
In an effort to derive a workable standard of judicial review for
informal rulemaking, this Note examines the functional roles of the
traditional standards of review, "arbitrary and capricious" and "sub-
stantial evidence." The Note argues first that the substantial evidence
test should be adopted as the standard of factual review for informal
rulemaking. Second, the Note proposes that the reviewing stance for
factual determinations should be explicitly recognized as a flexible
one, varying with the determinability of the facts and with the statu-
tory mandate of the agency. When the factual basis for action is neces-
sarily uncertain, or when Congress has identified dangers to the public
health and welfare to be avoided regardless of cost to competing eco-
nomic or social goals, the courts should hold agencies to a lower
standard of factual proof.
I. The Traditional Standards of Review
As a basis for judicial review of agency determinations of fact,- the
Administrative Procedure Act 3 establishes two alternative standards of
scrutiny, "arbitrary and capricious" and "unsupported by substantial
evidence."14 Which standard will be applied in review of agency deter-
I. For discussion of the special problems posed by technical regulatory decisions, see
Boyer, Alternatives to Administrative Trial-Type Hearings for Resolving Complex Scien-
tific, Economic, and Social Issues, 71 MICH. L. REv. 111 (1972); Gelpe & Tarlock, The
Uses of Scientific Information in Environmental Decisionnaking, 48 S. CAL. L. R~v. 371
(1974); Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L.J. 1227 (1966); Tribe, Tech-
nology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of Instrumental Rationality.
46 S. CAL. L. REV. 617 (1973).
2. In any scrutiny of administrative action, the reviewing court must ascertain first
whether the agency has acted within its statutory mandate; second, whether the agency
has adequately demonstrated the facts it relies on: and third, whether the agency's
policy choice can rationally follow from the facts adduced. The second and third re-
viewing tasks in effect draw the familiar distinction between judicial scrutiny of ques-
tions of fact and judicial scrutiny of questions of law. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL
OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACaION 546-65 (1965). In Judge Friendly's terminology, the distinction
is between "insufficient or erroneous findings" and "unsustainable reasons." Friendly,
Chenery Revisited: Reflections on Reversal and Remand of Administrative Orders, 1969
DUKE L.J. 199, 209-22.
3. 5 U.S.C. §§ 501-706 (1970) [hereinafter cited as APA1.
4. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (E) (1970). The former standard is worded in the statute "ar-
bitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,"
but is usually denominated merely "arbitrary and capricious."
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minations of fact depends on the type of agency proceeding5 and the
attendant standard provided in the Administrative Procedure Act, and
on any special standard of review imposed by the particular regulatory
act.
The potential difference between the standards of "arbitrary and
capricious" and "substantial evidence" is limited to the review of
factual determinations. However formal the type of agency proceed-
ing, an agency's policy choices are reviewed under the arbitrary and
capricious standard, which asks merely whether the policy choice is
rationally connected to its factual basis. 6 The substantial evidence
standard applied in adjudication and formal rulemaking has been con-
fined to evaluating the factual basis for decisions.
7
The interpretation given to the two standards with respect to fac-
tual determinations has changed considerably over time. At first, un-
der either test, administrative agency action received extreme defer-
ence. Reviewing courts applying the substantial evidence standard
often felt obliged to sustain agency findings if supported by some evi-
dence anywhere in the record, "without reference to how heavily the
countervailing evidence may preponderate."s In 1951, Universal Cam-
era Corp. v. NLRB9 reinterpreted the standard of substantial evidence
as imposing a heavier burden of justification on the agency. The re-
viewing court was to evaluate the record as a whole to determine
whether it reasonably supported an agency conclusion.10 The arbitrary
and capricious standard of review still required only that the agency
5. The Administrative Procedure Act recognizes four formats for administrative de-
cisionmaking. In descending order of procedural formality, they are adjudication (5
U.S.C. § 554 (1970)); formal rulemaking (5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1970), invoking the formal
procedures of §§ 556 and 557 "when rules are required by statute to be made on the
record after opportunity for an agency hearing"); informal rulemaking (5 U.S.C. § 553(c)
(1970)); and nonformalized decisionmaking (5 U.S.C. § 553(a), (b)(A), (B) (1970), and any
agency action not included in the definitions of "rate," "order," "adjudication," "li-
cense," or "sanction," 5 U.S.C. § 551(4), (6), (7), (8), (10) (1970)). These four modes of
decisionmaking are generally invoked explicitly or implicitly in the enabling acts es-
tablishing and giving powers to administrative agencies.
6. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943). See also Friendly, supra note 2, at 209-17.
7. This differing scrutiny of facts and of policy was most recently approved in
Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 419 U.S. 281, 284-85 (1974). Un-
fortunately, regulatory statutes providing specifically for substantial evidence review often
fail to state that the standard applies only to facts and not to policy.
8. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 481 (1951).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 490. The evidentiary burden of the agency under the substantial evidence
standard has been variously stated. One frequently invoked formulation, retaining vi-
tality even after Universal Camera, is that of Consolidated Edison v. NLRB, 305 U.S.
197, 229 (1938): "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such rele-
%ant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
See also Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966):
The possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not
prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial
evidence.
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act with rationality and consistency." "Arbitrary and capricious" re-
view thus came to be considered "soft" or cursory, while substantial
evidence implied more searching review of agency action.
II. Substantial Evidence Review of Informal Rulemaking
The notice and comment procedures of informal rulemaking 2 have
the advantage of allowing effective public participation in agency de-
cisionmaking without requiring the time-consuming formalities of ad-
judication and formal rulemaking.13 This ease of procedure has led
Congress to frequently specify informal rulemaking for agency deci-
sions under new regulatory statutes.
14
The Administrative Procedure Act is susceptible to a reading re-
quiring substantial evidence review of factual determinations in in-
formal rulemaking. The substantial evidence standard, according to
the APA, applies to formal rulemaking, adjudication, and cases "other-
wise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by stat-
ute."15 If this last category is to have any referent, it must be to
informal rulemaking notice and comment procedures, for they are
the only procedural format other than formal rulemaking and adjudi-
cation that produces a "record."' 6 The informal rulemaking pro-
11. See, e.g., Superior Oil Co. v. FPC, 322 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 922 (1964).
12. Notice and comment procedures are set out in the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(e) (1970).
Typically an agency will formulate a proposed regulation, then publish it in a notice
in the Federal Register inviting comments from interested parties. After the agency has
considered the comments, it either reformulates the regulation in light of the comments
or adopts the proposed regulation as its final decision. Finally, the adopted rules are
published along with a statement of their basis and purpose.
13. Adjudicatory hearings and formal rulemaking proceedings, conducted under 5
U.S.C. §§ 556 and 557, approximate the procedure of a civil trial. However, the right
of cross-examination is limited to that "required for a full and true disclosure of the
facts." 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1970). In formal rulemaking, all or part of the evidence can
be submitted in written form if the parties will not be prejudiced.
14. E.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2058(a)(2) (Supp. III 1973); Flam-
mable Fabrics Act of 1967, 15 U.S.C. § 1193 (1970); Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (1970). See Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857a
(1970).
15. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1970).
16. The original House report on the APA makes clear that § 553 informal rule-
making was thought to produce a record:
The agency must keep a record and analyze and consider all relevant matter pre-
sented prior to the issuance of rules. The required statement of the basis and pur-
pose of rules issued should not only relate to the data so presented but with rea-
sonable fullness explain the actual basis and objectives of the rule.
HousE CoMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Ac, H.R. REP. No. 1980,
79th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1946).
The record of informal rulemaking consists at a minimum of the Federal Register
notice, all comments submitted to the agency and other information compiled by the
agency. The record may be unfocused because the evidence is generally not shaped by
cross-examination or oral argument. Such a record may be somewhat difficult to review.
See Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and
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cedures have also been held to constitute a "hearing."'
17
In practice, however, the applicable standard is disputed. The Su-
preme Court has stated in dicta' 8 that substantial evidence review
governs informal rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act
and has resolved a number of cases by that standard. The lower courts
have nonetheless restricted use of the substantial evidence standard
to adjudication and formal rulemaking while using the arbitrary and
capricious standard to review informal rulemaking. 19
A. Arbitrary and Capricious": A Standard Made Rigorous
The difference between the standards of review has narrowed in
the face of the increased use of agency rulemaking powers. The sub-
stantial evidence standard has been applied as a rather flexible gauge
of the quantum of facts necessary to establish a basis for agency ac-
tion. 20 At the same time the arbitrary and capricious standard for
review of facts has been applied more rigorously.
Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 519, 525
(1970); Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REV. 185, 222-26
(1974). But see p. 1760 infra. The focus of the record can be sharpened if the agency
gives a full explanation of its evaluation of the record in its required statement of
basis and purpose (5 U.S.C. § 553(c)) and if the parties cite to relevant parts of the
record in their appellate briefs. For possible procedures to improve the informal rule-
making record, see Pedersen, 85 YALE L.J. (forthcoming).
17. The notice and comment procedures of § 553 have been treated by the Supreme
Court as equivalent to a "hearing" within the meaning of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act. In United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1972), the Court ap-
proved a broad definition of "hearing" as including both § 553 notice, and comment
procedures and §§ 556-57 proceedings that use written rather than oral evidence.
The immediate issue before the Court in Florida East Coast Railway was whether
the Interstate Commerce Commission's procedures for freight car ratemaking had com-
plied with the requirements of a hearing under § 1(14) of the Interstate Commerce
Act. 49 U.S.C. § 1(14) (1970). In holding that the procedures were adequate, the ma-
jority relied on United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., which established that
the § 1(14) hearing requirement is satisfied by § 553 notice and comment procedures.
United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 756-57 (1972). The Court also
relied on the language of § 553(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act, which makes § 553
procedures applicable to interpretative rules when a "hearing is required by statute." 5
U.S.C. § 553(b), cited in 410 U.S. at 240-41. The Court thus defined the § 1(14) hearing
requirement by reference to the scope of an Administrative Procedure Act "hearing" un-
der § 553.
Note that under the APA a "hearing" is distinct from a "hearing on the record." The
latter invokes formal rulemaking procedures. United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel
Corp., supra at 757. See also Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267,
1313 (1975).
18. See pp. 1756-57 infra.
19. Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (applying arbitrary and
capricious standard to informal rulemaking); City of Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1074 (1972); Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n, Inc.
v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1968). But see Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp.,
472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972) (applying substantial evidence review to informal rulemaking);
cf. Bunny Bear, Inc. v. Peterson, 473 F.2d 1002, 1006 (Ist Cir. 1973) (applying arbitrary
and capricious review but characterizing it as "differ[ing] little, if at all, from the stan-
dard normally used in substantial evidence review").
20. See note 48 and pp. 1761-62 infra; see also Society of Plastics Indus., Inc. v.
OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1975); 4 K. DAvis, ADMINisTmATIvW LAW TRPEATSE § 29.02,
at 126 (1958) (the substantial evidence rule "is made of rubber, not of wood").
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The lower courts' more rigorous use of the arbitrary and capricious
standard in review of informal rulemaking can be traced to two de-
velopments in the case law. First, the Supreme Court made clear in
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe 2 1 that a stronger interpre-
tation of the arbitrary and capricious standard was warranted in appli-
cation to nonformalized decisionmaking:
-22
[T]he generally applicable standards [of judicial review under
the Administrative Procedure Act] require the reviewing court to
engage in a substantial inquiry. Certainly, the Secretary's decision
is entitled to a presumption of regularity .... But that presump-
tion is not to shield his action from a thorough, probing, in-depth
review.
23
The reviewing court was to scrutinize the facts and consider whether
the decision was "based on a consideration of the relevant factors and
whether there has been a clear error of judgment."24 Such supervision
21. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
22. The subsequent decision in Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973), does not diminish
the rigor which the Supreme Court infused into the arbitrary and capricious standard
in Overton. Camp established that the further submission of information to facilitate
judicial review of nonformalized decisionmaking did not extend to having a de novo
hearing in the reviewing court. Instead, the agency was to provide "either through
affidavits or testimony, such additional explanation of the reasons for the agency de-
cision as may prove necessary." Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. at 143. The Court then noted
that the brief explanation by the Comptroller of the Currency of his decision to grant
a bank charter might be adequate in light of the underlying record. Id.
Professor Verkuil has argued that this amounts to approval of a loosening of the
stringency of review found necessary in Overton Park. Verkuil, supra note 16, at 213-14.
Such an interpretation is unwarranted in light of the procedural and substantive pos-
ture of Camp. First, the Supreme Court did not undertake substantive review of the
Comptroller's decision in Camp and thus had no occasion to examine the agency record
for support of the agency's finding that a new bank was an "uneconomic venture." The
Court's remark was thus merely a prediction as to what factual showing might prove
sufficient upon remand to the district court. Second, the Comptroller's responsibility
for granting bank charters in Camp was broadly discretionary, whereas the Department
of Transportation's policy choice under Overton Park was highly structured and con-
fined. Compare Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970) and Department
of Transp. Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970) (the Secretary "shall not approve an) program
or project" that requires the use of any public parkland "unless (1) there is no feasible
and prudent alternative to the use of such land, and (2) such program includes all pos-
sible planning to minimize harm to such park") (emphasis added) with National Bank
Act, 12 U.S.C. § 27 (1970) ("If, upon a careful examination of the facts so reported,
and of any other facts which may come to the knowledge of the comptroller . . . it
appears that such association is lawfully entitled to commence the business of banking,
the comptroller shall give to such association a certificate . . .") (emphasis added).
Given the broad discretion in awarding bank charters that is confided to the Comp-
troller under the statute, a simple explanation of his decision may have been all that
was required to guard against arbitrary action. So long as the factual base rationally
supported his findings and policy decision, the existence of 20 better dispositions would
be irrelevant. The apparent brevity of analysis is linked to this breadth of policy dis-
cretion. For another example, see Di Vosta v. Lee, 488 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1973) (ar-
bitrary and capricious review of agency decision based in part on environmental impact
statements, where agency had a substantial degree of discretion). See also K. DAN Is, At-
MINISTRATIvE LAW TEXT § 30.06, at 533 (1972).
23. 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1970) (emphasis added).
24. Id. at 416. However, "the court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for
that of the agency." Id.
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of the factors considered by an agency and the rationality of its policy
choice was a considerable departure from the traditional deference2 5
characterizing arbitrary and capricious review. Since nonformalized de-
cisionmaking provides the baseline for judicial scrutiny of adminis-
trative action, Overton's rigor would have seemed appropriate for in-
formal rulemaking.
Second, even before Overton was decided, the, courts of appeals had
begun stricter review of informal rulemaking under the rubric of "ar-
bitrary and capricious."2 6 Although dictum in Overton seems to have
stated that the substantial evidence standard should be used for in-
formal rulemaking review,2 7 the appellate courts instead relied on
Overton's "arbitrary and capricious" language,281 and assumed that it
supported their current reviewing stance.
29
The new bite of arbitrary and capricious review by the courts of
appeals is evidenced in the remanding of decisions to the rulemaking
agency and in the courts' careful evaluation of complex and often
probabilistic evidence.30 Despite this increased rigor, however, the
25. See, e.g., Judge Bazelon's discussion of the history of administrative review in
Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597-98 (D.C. Cir. 1971). For
a traditional interpretation of arbitrary and capricious as a lenient standard, see 4 K.
DAvis, supra note 20, § 30.05, at 213-14. See also note 11 supra.
26. E.g., Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n, Inc. v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir.
1968).
27. See pp. 1756-57 infra.
28. See language quoted at p. 1754 supra; Citizens to Preserve O'erton Park v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
29. See South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 655 (1st Cir. 1974); Portland
Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
921 (1974t); Essex Chem. Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427, 434 (D.C. Cir. 1973); City
of Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
30. For example, in Essex Chem. Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
the court reviewed the Environmental Protection Agency's stationary source regulations
tinder the Clean Air Act. The court upheld the regulation limiting emissions from
elemental sulfur feedstock plants primarily on the basis of company-supplied test data.
It was unimpressed with the EPA's own test results because they were not carried out
tinder conditions in accord with previously promulgated EPA regulations requiring
plant operation at capacity. The court remanded the EPA's performance standards for
generator plants because the scrubber systems chosen by the agency were not first an-
alyzed for "counter.productive environmental effects" resulting from disposal of their
liquid byproduct. The court in Essex thus carefully scrutinized the factual evidence
supporting the final policy choice and the reasonableness of the inferences the agency
had drawn from the evidence.
Similarly in Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1974), close factual review
was undertaken by the court. Under the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, the EPA
administrator had issued interim standards requiring catalytic converters on a substantial
number of automobiles by the 1975 model year. Amoco involved a challenge to regulations
that established a ceiling of 0.05 grams per gallon for the lead content of gasoline. The
court noted that uncontradicted evidence was introduced that catalytic converters were
poisoned by gasoline averaging more lead than 0.05 gram/gallon, that the 0.07 gram
gallon standard suggested by the refiners was based on refinery and distribution standards
irrelevant under the statute, and that the practical experience of the Amoco Oil Company
showed no scientific or technological obstacles to meeting the lower ceiling. On the
basis of this close review of the evidence, 'the court concluded that the EPA could rea-
sonably make the policy choice of a 0.05 gram/'gallon ceiling.
See also CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Train, 43 U.S.L.W. 2467 (8th Cir. May 5, 1975) (new source
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courts of appeals still frequently characterize the arbitrary and ca-
pricious test as a lesser standard of review than the substantial evi-
dence test.3 ' Courts of appeals also have differed on whether addi-
tional procedures are necessary to prepare an informal rulemaking
record suitable for careful factual scrutiny.3 2
B. "Substantial Evidence" and Overlooked Dicta
The Supreme Court has made no indisputable ruling that substan-
tial evidence review of the facts is required for informal rulemaking
under the Administrative Procedure Act. However, the cases in which
the Court has reviewed or discussed informal rulemaking-Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, United States v. Midwest Video
Corp.,33 and United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp.3 4-seem
to assume that "substantial evidence" is the applicable standard under
the APA.35 In Overton Park, the Court suggested in dicta that sub-
stantial evidence review applies:
Review under the substantial-evidence test is authorized only
when the agency action is taken pursuant to a rulemaking provi-
standards under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act for the corn wet milling in-
dustry held arbitrary and capricious because no evidentiary support to establish that
available technology would be effective when applied within the industry).
31. In Consumers Union v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 491 F.2d 810 (2d Cir.
1974), Judge Timbers hypothesized additional explanations for the agency's action, be-
yond those offered by the agency itself, in a manner reminiscent of the old "cursory"
arbitrary and capricious review. See also Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 7 ENVIRON. REP. CAS. 1382
(D.C. Cir. Jan. 28, 1974) (Wright, J., dissenting), vacated on order granting rehearing
en banc, No. 73-2205 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 17, 1975), reheard en bane (D.C. Cir. May 30, 1975),
quoted in note 46 infra; Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process, 59 CORNELL
L. R V. 375, 392-93 (1974).
32. Compare South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 660-61 (1st Cir. 1974) (re-
jecting extra procedures) with International Harvester v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 629-31,
649 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (requiring extra procedures).
This continued concern with extra procedures needed to provide an illuminating record
for the reviewing court suggests that many courts are taking seriously Overton Park's
command of careful factual scrutiny. See, e.g., Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus,
486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Mobil Oil v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Walter
Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
The conclusion that procedures in addition to notice and comment are not required
as a matter of due process or statutory construction of the APA is well-supported in
the literature. See generally Wright, Court of Appeals Review of Federal Regulatory
Agency Decisionmaking, 26 AD. L. REv. 199 (1974); Wright, supra note 31; Note, The
Judicial Role in Defining Procedural Requirements for Rulemaking, 87 HARv. L. REv.
782 (1974). But see Friendly, supra note 17, at 1314-15, who suggests that the ad hoc
use of additional procedures reaches largely the same result as the accepted practice of
remanding because of inadequate evidence. Nonetheless, insistence on adequate notice
and comment procedures at the agency level seems preferable as a matter of practice.
33. 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
34. 406 U.S. 742 (1972).
35. The only other Supreme Court case touching on the standard of review in in-
formal rulemaking under the APA is American Trucking Ass'ns v. United States, 344
U.S. 298, 314, 304 (1953) ("evidence marshalled . . . plainly supports the conclusion
that the continued effectiveness of [the ICC's] regulation requires the rules presented"
and "evidence is overwhelming that ... practices directly affect . . . the public interest
in necessary service" (emphasis added)).
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sion of the Administrative Procedure Act itself, 5 U.S.C. § 553 ...
[informal and formal rulemaking], or when the agency action is
based on a public adjudicatory hearing. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 556,
557 . . . [procedures for formal rulemaking and adjudicatory
hearings].30
Similarly, in United States v. Midwest Video Corp., the plurality opin-
ion assumed that in Federal Communications Commission notice and
comment procedures for formulating cable television regulations, the
standard applicable to the record of written comments was whether
the regulation was "supported by substantial evidence that it will pro-
mote the public interest."3 7 The Court concluded the standard was
met only after reviewing the FCC's evidence on the cost of starting a
cable television system and after examining the agency's consideration
of the cost of originating programs. The Court again applied a sub-
stantial evidence standard to APA informal rulemaking in United
States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., in review of Interstate Com-
merce Commission regulation of freight car shortages.38
36. 401 U.S. 402, 414 (1971). The Court's reference to § 553 in the language quoted
arguably might be intended to refer only to the formal rulemaking provision invoked
by § 553(c). Such an interpretation is unlikely, however, because § 553 is mainly devoted
to setting out informal rulemaking procedures. Section 553 refers to formal rulemaking
only in noting the instances when informal rulemaking procedures do not apply and
resort must instead be made to the formal rulemaking procedures of §§ 556 and 557.
Sections 556 and 557 cover only formal rulemaking and adjudicatory procedures. If
the Court had meant to confine the substantial evidence standard to formal rulemaking
and adjudication, it might have cited more appropriately to §§ 556 and 557 alone.
37. 406 U.S. 649, 671, 673 (1972). Arguably, the substantial evidence standard might
have been applied in Midwest Video only because of some special standard of review
governing the FCC rather than the general review standards of the APA for informal
rulemaking. According to National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 224
(1943), decided before the passage of the APA, the governing standard of review of
factual findings by the FCC was "supported by evidence." At the time, the following
odd standard was mandated by the Communications Act of 1934:
[F]indings of fact by the Commission, if supported by substantial evidence, shall
be conclusive unless it shall clearly appear that the findings of the Commission are
arbitrary or capricious.
Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, § 402(e), 48 Stat. 1094.
However, this section was amended in 1952 to make FCC actions reviewable under
the general review standards of the APA. See 47 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1970), invoking 5 U.S.C.
§ 706 (1970) (formerly codified as 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (1952)). The Midwest Video Court's
use of the substantial evidence standard in 1972 was therefore governed by the APA
standards generally applicable to informal rulemaking. Midwest Video's substantial evi-
dence review could not properly have depended on National Broadcasting.
38. The Court held that
[tihe Commission's finding that there are recurring periods of significant length
when there is not an adequate freight car supply to service shippers is supported by
substantial evidence.
406 U.S. at 753. See also id. at 746:
Central to the justification for the [ICC's] promulgation of these rules is its finding
that there was a nationwide shortage of freight car ownership. The court below as-
sumed the correctness of that finding, and we conclude that it was supported by
substantial evidence.
The Court reviewed in detail evidence on the number of cars and practices of the rail-
roads before concluding that there was sufficient support for the factual determinations
underlying the ICC regulations. Id. at 749-53.
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In the courts of appeals,39 application of the substantial evidence
standard to informal rulemaking has been rare40-a result of the cir-
cuit court's assumption that the substantial evidence standard applies
only when there is an adjudicatory record. 41 In at least one instance,
however, a court of appeals has recognized that the two standards of
review are often functionally equivalent.
42
C. Explaining the Discrepancy
In a sense it is peculiar that the Supreme Court has not granted
certiorari in an informal rulemaking case to settle the conflict between
its apparent assumption that the substantial evidence standard applies
and the lower courts' continued adherence to the arbitrary and capri-
cious standard. Of course the Supreme Court does not frequently re-
It might be argued that the substantial evidence standard used in Allegheny-Ludlunm
was mandated by special review standards applicable to the ICC before the APA was
passed. See Assigned Car Cases, 274 U.S. 564, 580, 584 (1927) (findings of fact in rule-
making under the Esch Car Service Act are valid if there is "evidence to support the
finding"); Western Paper Makers' Chem. Co. v. United States, 271 U.S. 268, 271 (1926)
("finding of the [ICC] is conclusive if supported by substantial evidence").
However, the review standards applied to the ICC before passage of the APA appear
to have been imposed as a matter of ad hoc judicial practice rather than mandated
by particular regulatory statutes. See ATr'Y GEN. COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE,
REPORT ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th
Cong., Ist Sess. 89 (1941); see also New Eng. Div. Case. 261 U.S. 184, 203 (1923); Skinner
& Eddy Corp. v. United States, 249 U.S. 557, 562 (1919); ICC v. Union Pac. R.R., 222
U.S. 541, 547-48 (1912). Such nonstatutory review standards would be superseded by the
statutory review standards of the APA.
39. Regulatory statutes often specify that the courts of appeals can review adminis-
trative action directly. See, e.g., Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (1970).
40. See note 19 supra.
41. E.g., City of Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (footnote omitted):
The record in a[n informal rulemaking] proceeding ordinarily will contain more
generalized than specific information, may not contain information tested by cross-
examination and will frequently contain much conclusory information based on
data gathered by the interested parties. For this reason, application of the sub-
stantial evidence test, defined and conceptualized as it frequently is in terms of
whether or not a directed verdict should be granted in a jury trial, to findings re-
sulting from a[n informal rulemaking] proceeding would be of scant utility.
42. Associated Indus. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 349-50 (2d Cir.
1973) (Friendly, J.): "[I]n the review of rules of general applicability made after notice
and comment rulemaking, the two criteria do tend to converge." See also National Nu-
tritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688 705 (2d Cir. 1975) (Lumbard, J.,
concurring).
One example of such "convergence" is two cases arising under the National Highway
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1970). Each in-
volved review by a court of appeals of informal rulemaking under the act. In Auto-
motive Parts & Accessories Ass'n, Inc. v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 336-37 (D.C. Cir. 1968),
the court applied the arbitrary and capricious standard in reviewing a regulation re-
quiring mandatory head restraints in new automobiles. In upholding the regulation,
Judge McGowan considered research and statistical evidence supporting the agency's
conclusions about the safety value of head restraints and the appropriateness of install-
ing them in the factory. In Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659, 668-70
(6th Cir. 1972), the court used a substantial evidence standard to examine the assump-
tions of the methodology used by the agency to justify air bag safety standards for cars.
Here too the court examined technical and statistical evidence. The Automotive Parts
court's analysis strikingly resembles the analysis undertaken in Chrysler in detail, scope,
and methodology.
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view the scrutiny of administrative action by the courts of appeals. 43
Nor is it clear that petitioners have recognized and argued the dis-
crepancy in reviewing standards. The idiosyncratic facts of each case
often conceal the development of generalized legal standards; the rul-
ings the Court does make can be "distinguished" as limited to their
special statutory and factual context.44 Perhaps most important, the
arbitrary and capricious standard when rigorously applied in the lower
courts can closely approximate the Supreme Court's use of the sub-
stantial evidence standard. The discrepancy may thus appear to peti-
tioners and the Court to be more of form than of substance, not af-
fecting the final outcome of the particular case.
D. Substantial Evidence as a Proposed Standard of Review
The new rigor of the arbitrary and capricious standard and the
Supreme Court's recent use of substantial evidence in APA informal
rulemaking evinces an emerging consensus on the desirable scope
of review in rulemaking. The. standard of review now employed, what-
ever the rubric, is "stricter" than the traditional cursory review. This
rigor is desirable as a matter of consistency, because it resolves the
possible anomaly posed by Overton of a less intrusive role for the re-
viewing court in informal rulemaking than in nonformalized deci-
sionmaking. Practically, it provides a method of review that allows the
court to curb and correct agency action contrary to law. The court
is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency,
but the legitimating effect" of judicial review of administrative action
is gained only after meaningful scrutiny of the adequacy of the agency's
factual and policy grounds for action.
The explicit adoption of "substantial evidence" as the standard ap-
plicable to informal rulemaking under the APA would have the ad-
vantage of avoiding lapses from this relatively strict reviewing posture.
43. Most often certiorari is not granted unless some major statutory or procedural
policy is at stake. See, e.g., Mobil Oil v. FPC, 417 U.S. 283, 310 (1974), quoting Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 491 (1951):
Whether on the record as a whole there is substantial evidence to support agency
findings is a question which Congress has placed in the keeping of the Courts of
Appeals. This Court will intervene only in what ought to be the rare instance
when the standard appears to have been misapprehended or grossly misapplied.
44. The development of case law under each regulatory statute is surprisingly insular.
This insularity stems from the delegation to the agencies of highly specialized powers in
individual fields of competence. The viewpoint of Mr. Justice Harlan in the Permian
Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 790 (1968), emphasizing the distinctiveness of agency
action, is typical:
[T]he breadth and complexity of the [FPC's] responsibilities demand that it be given
every reasonable opportunity to formulate methods of regulation appropriate for
the solution of its intensely practical difficulties.
45. Cf. C. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 47-51 (1960).
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To the extent that arbitrary and capricious review is applied rigor-
ously, using the substantial evidence label may seem merely a nominal
change to conform the actual rigor to the statutory language of the
APA. But an unequivocal holding by the Supreme Court announcing
the standard would insulate informal rulemaking from the lingering
influence of the view that arbitrary and capricious review is properly
deferential.46 Despite Overton Park, the notion of arbitrary and ca-
pricious review as deferring to agency assertions of fact, as demanding
minimal rationality and consistency in reasoning, and as allowing ju-
dicial construction of a rationale for action when the agency fails to
offer one, still overhangs the application of the arbitrary and capricious
standard.
The Supreme Court's tacit use of the substantial evidence standard
in such cases as Midwest Video and Allegheny-Ludlum suggests that
there are no insuperable difficulties in applying the substantial evi-
dence test to a record not shaped through adjudicatory procedures.
47
The cases also suggest that "substantial evidence" can in practice be
a flexible test accommodating the rigor of appellate scrutiny of the
facts to the certainty with which the facts can be established.48
III. Flexibility in Factual Review
A clear holding by the Supreme Court that substantial evidence is
the applicable standard of review would not fully clarify the reviewing
46. See, e.g., Judge Wright's dissent in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 7 ENVIRON. REP. CAS.
1382, 1400 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 28, 1975):
It may be that the courts are so willing to abandon the statutorily mandated "ar-
bitrary and capricious" standard because the standard is so singularly undemanding.
The extreme deference the statute demands of the reviewing court cuts against the
grain of judges who have been taught that their generalist backgrounds equip them
to provide dispassionate and comprehensive answers to any sort of problem ...
Congress recognized that review of agency informal rulemaking was not a proper
occasion for such activism.
47. Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Mobil Oil v.
FPC, 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973). But see Verkuil, supra note 16, at 222-26.
The concern that a record not shaped by adjudicatory cross-examination might be
improperly weighted by the agency in favor of its own determination is not well-founded.
The informal rulemaking notice and comment record has to include all negative com-
ments received. The agency will also usually include all information supporting its posi-
tion. The resulting record may be unfocused, but it is not incomplete. See Phillips Petro-
leum Co. v. FPC, 475 F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1973) (adopting informal rulemaking procedures
for the factually complex task of area ratemaking, where substantial evidence review was
required under the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (1970)).
Gauging the adequacy of an administrative record by comparison to judicial adjudica-
tory records would be misleading, as an agency has the right to rely on its expertise
in evaluating evidence. See, e.g., Market St. Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n, 324 U.S. 548 (1945).
48. The Supreme Court in Allegheny-Ludlum closely reviewed the inferences drawn
from detailed factual findings about the availability of freight cars on the nation's rail-
roads. 406 U.S. 742, 746-48, 749-53 (1972). By contrast, in Midwest Video, the Court
found the substantial evidence standard to be satisfied by the agency's predictions about
the financial ability of cable telecasters to cope with their new program responsibilities.
406 U.S. 649 (1972).
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court's responsibilities. For the mechanical labeling of review pro-
cedures has obscured the existing and necessary flexibility in the scope
of judicial review. Complex, technical decisionmaking49 requires an
adaptable approach.
A. Case Studies
Two recent cases applying to informal rulemaking a substantial
evidence standard required by particular regulatory statutes have dealt
explicitly with the problem of factual uncertainty.
Industrial Union v. Hodgson"° evaluated asbestos exposure regula-
tions promulgated by the Department of Labor under the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act.51 The D.C. Circuit, in an opinion by
Judge McGowan, recognized two classes of factual determinations:
the class of "determinable facts" to be found from evidence in the
record, and the class where factual certainties do not exist or "where
facts alone do not provide the answer. '0 2 In the second "nondeter-
minable" class, the agency was required to state the uncertainties and
then "go on to identify the considerations found persuasive." 3
Establishing an asbestos exposure limit to protect worker health in-
volved the resolution of factual questions of this second type; "in-
sufficient data [was] presently available to make a fully informed
factual determination."" The final exposure standard had to be based
on difficult predictions, such as the estimate that a certain percentage
of asbestos workers would develop fatal cancers in two to three decades
if subjected to some unknown level of exposure through a biological
mechanism as yet unidentified. Confronted with such problematic ques-
tions on review, the court approved a strict exposure limit that re-
solved doubts in favor of the health of employees, even though "the
evidence did not establish any one position as clearly correct." 55
49. Informal rulemaking powers have been granted and exercised most frequently un-
der statutes designed to protect the environment, consumer safety, and occupational
health. See note 14 supra. Regulation in these areas requires the ability to predict the
effect on public health and welfare of changes in sophisticated technology and pro-
duction methods.
50. 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
51. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1970). OSHA provides for review of rulemaking under the
substantial evidence standard. 29 U.S.C. § 655(f). The court properly applied the sub-
stantial evidence test only to the facts. 499 F.2d at 473.
52. 499 F.2d at 476.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 474. The court described the facts as "on the frontiers of scientific knowl-
edge." Id.
55. Id. at 478-79. The court noted that
reliable data is not currently available with respect to the precisely predictable
health effects of various levels of exposure to asbestos dust; nevertheless, the Sec-
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The Industrial Union court thus followed two important though
implicit steps in dealing with factual uncertainty. First, it recognized
that the required factual proof should vary directly with the potential
for factual certainty. Second, the court recognized that the statutory
policy preference for protection of employee health should also reduce
the level of factual certainty required.
The Supreme Court similarly approved a lower level of factual proof
for policy reasons in Mobil Oil v. FPC.56 The Court held that the
substantial evidence standard, applied in the relatively certain factual
context of Federal Power Commission rate setting, could properly be
adjusted "in this time of acute energy shortage" 57 to allow a lesser
degree of proof for novel FPC rate proposals. The FPC was thus held
to be implicitly authorized, in carrying out its policy obligation of
assuring the supply of gas, to consider the energy crisis as a justifica-
tion for reducing its normal burden of factual proof. 5
B. The Sliding Scale Standard
Two variables thus shape the need for flexibility in factual review:
the relative certainty of the factual data available, and the importance
56. 417 U.S. 283 (1974).
57. Id. at 331.
58. The statute provided that supply was to be maintained by setting "just and rea-
sonable rates." 15 U.S.C. § 717(c)(a) (1970). The Court found that an inability to de-
termine the amount of gas that would be found and sold under a proposed rate struc-
ture was allowable where the Commission's difficulties "did not stem from any failure
to seek answers." 417 U.S. at 318.
In the Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 767, 811 (1968), cited in Indus-
trial Union v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474-75 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the Supreme Court
similarly recognized agency flexibility to act in the face of factual uncertainty in a
new field of regulation, where existing methodology or research is deficient.
Several cases applying the "arbitrary and capricious" standard have also explicitly
recognized that the standard for factual review is flexible. In Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA,
501 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1974), discussed supra note 30, the court deferred to EPA's 0.05
gram/gallon ceiling for gasoline lead content for two stated reasons: first, the factual
basis was "in the nature of a prediction for which supporting data is necessarily sparse
or absent" (501 F.2d at 742); second, the agency was entitled to weigh as a matter of
policy the competing risks involved in "underprotection as compared to overprotection."
Id., citing Industrial Union v. Hodgson, supra at 475.
Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1974), reached a similar result in regard to
EPA rulemaking under the procedures of the Clean Air Act, where the agency rejected
state implementation plans and substituted its own regulations. The statute required ac-
tion, the Fifth Circuit concluded, and expressed a congressional policy choice to clean the
environment and protect health even on the basis of "projections, assumptions and
flimsy data." Id. at 319. The agency could properly allow for a "margin of error" in
setting standards to assure that congressional goals of air quality were achieved. Id. As
the court applied it, this "margin of error" allowed a lower level of factual certainty.
[T]he agency's use of uncertain data is necessary if it is to perform its statutory
duty. In these circumstances we can only require that its data be the best that is
feasibly available.
Id. The court did, however, impose a correlative duty on the agency to reconsider and
revise its requirements as better data became available. Id. at 301 n.16, 319 n.49. Cf.
Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 511 F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (flexibility in factual re-
view appropriate for an experimental program disallowed once the program could no
longer be appropriately characterized as experimental).
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of the social risks at stake as weighed either by Congress or by the regu-
lating agency.59 These variables, however, have not been synthesized
into a reviewing stance generally applicable to informal rulemaking.
Instead, they have been recognized hesitantly, on an ad hoc basis, as
appropriate only to factually distinctive regulatory contexts. Arguably,
cases shifting the burden of proof from the agency to parties chal-
lenging a regulation provide another legal mechanism for allowing
flexibility in factual review; 0 if neither side can "demonstrate" its
factual assertions, assignment of the burden of proof effectively de-
cides the case.0t But a standard that explicitly evaluates the appro-
priateness of flexibility in review of facts seems preferable to the un-
systematic use of the burden of proof approach.
1. Factual Determinability
To make factual determinability a part of the sliding scale standard
rests on a distinction between factual findings that courts are accus-
tomed to making and facts that are not provable in the accepted ju-
ridical sense of proof. Short of an explicit statutory directive, 2 the
courts have resisted taking action on factual information that does not
reach the level of certainty on which they are accustomed to rest de-
cisions. 3 Typical of apparently certain factual information is evidence
59. The statutory risk assessment may have to be implemented by a specific assess-
ment of risk at the agency level. This agency judgment is of course a mixed question
of fact and policy. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 7 ENVIRON. REP. CAs. 1382, 1393-94 (D.C. Cir.
Jan. 28, 1975) (Wright, J., dissenting). For example, to carry out a congressional direc-
tive to ban all substances that pose a "grave danger" to workers' health at whatever
economic cost, the agency must assess whether a particular substance is likely to pose
such a danger.
60. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 510 F.2d 1292, 1302 (D.C. Cir.
1975); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 592 n.22, 594 n.37
(D.C. Cir. 1971). See also Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the
Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 509, 535-36 (1974) (useful elaboration of the burden of
proof approach).
61. In practice, of course, the court may go on to analyze the evidence despite the
formal shift in burden. In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 510 F.2d 1292
(D.C. Cir. 1975), the court assigned the burden of proof to the opponents of the agency's
suspension of the registration of two pesticides, but also analyzed the evidence throughout
in terms of the statutorily specified substantial evidence standard. The interrelationship
of the two approaches was not made clear. See also International Harvester Co. v.
Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 643, 650-51 (D.C. Cir. 1973), and Judge Leventhal's sub-
sequent commentary, supra note 60, at 535-36.
62. E.g., the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act defines "substantial evidence" for new
drug applications as including experimental results which otherwise might be con-
sidered of insufficient reliability.
[Substantial evidence includes] adequate and well-controlled investigations . . . on
the basis of which it could fairly and responsibly be concluded by [trained and ex-
perienced] experts that the drug will have the effect it purports ....
21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1970).
63. See, e.g., Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 498 F.2d 1073 (8th Cir.), application to vacate
stay of injunction denied, 418 U.S. 911 (1974), injunction modified after rehearing en bane,
514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975). The Eighth Circuit originally stayed injunctive relief
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about past events, such as ratemaking evidence. 4 Typical of uncertain
information would be predictions of future events where there is no
past experience on which to rely-e.g., the performance capacities of
technology yet to be developed or the percentage of the population
likely to develop cancer after exposure to a newly suspected carcino-
gen.65
Regulatory statutes requiring preventative or curative action to be
undertaken on the basis of predictions of future harm necessarily con-
flict with the court's predisposition to require evidence of past events
as a basis for intervention in the private sector. The factual determin-
ability component of the sliding scale standard would make it the
reviewing court's responsibility to assure that the available evidence
used in making predictions is adequately adduced and rationally ap-
plied. But factual certainty in the sense of presently complete infor-
mation on the likely impact of future events could not be required.
2. Competing Risks
The policy component of the sliding scale test reflects whether there
has been a congressional reconciliation of competing societal risks, sub-
ordinating normally protected goals to another more highly valued
goal. The policy values underlying analysis of risk can be found in the
enabling legislation or in the agency's implementation of the con-
gressional value choice. For example, Congress may decide to protect
workers' health on the job even at the price of closing down a busi-
ness or radically altering business production methods. If a risk is iden-
against the discharge of asbestos into Lake Superior because it deemed the evidence of
a threat to public health to be uncertain.
Plaintiffs have failed to prove that a demonstrable health hazard exists. This failure,
we hasten to add, is not reflective of any weakness which it is within their power
to cure, but rather, given the current state of medical and scientific knowledge,
plairitiffs' case is based only on medical hypothesis and is simply beyond proof ...
[T]he district court's determination to resolve all doubts in favor of health safety
represents a legislative policy judgment, not a judicial one.
498 F.2d at 1084. The court later showed greater willingness to rely on uncertain factual
data in its March 14, 1975 decision, which modified the district court injunction to
allow Reserve Mining Co. a "reasonable time" to carry out plans for land disposal of
the wastes. 514 F.2d at 535-40.
64. See, e.g., Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 801-03 (1968), where area
ratemaking was based on data about costs, supply, and demand from past years. Since
the data on earlier years was available, the FPC was obliged to consider it in any pre-
dictions as to future costs, supply and demand.
65. Where there is little past experience or statistical data, predictions may seem
unusually speculative. See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d
615 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (factual basis for establishing the future availability of emission
control technology); Friends of the Earth v. EPA, 499 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1974) (establishing
requirements that will bring local area's air quality within national standards). A court
faced with reviewing such uncertain factual determinations under the sliding scale test
should evaluate whether the evidence available tends to support the factual conclusions
ultimately drawn by the agency.
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tified as great enough that other social losses will be tolerated to avoid
it, the statute may also allow action based on incomplete information
when it is aimed at avoiding the risk.
Statutes directing administrative agencies to regulate generally "in
the public interest" do not typically effect a risk analysis in this sense,
nor do they implicitly direct the agency to assess risk. For example,
the Federal Communication Commission's policy choices for cable tele-
vision and the Federal Power Commission's regulation of natural gas
pricing 6 do not ordinarily involve such policy ranking. However, such
a congressional mandate has been established explicitly or implicitly
in a number of recent regulatory statutes designed to protect public
health and safety in the automobile,0 7 in the home,68 at work,6 9 and
in the general environment.70 In such statutes, Congress has directed
the agency to protect the public health even though considerable eco-
nomic dislocation may result.71
The two factors of factual certainty and social risk assessment de-
rived from the cases thus should be combined to produce a sliding
scale standard for factual review of informal rulemaking decisions.
The structure of judicial review incorporating the sliding scale stan-
dard would involve three distinct conclusions: whether the relevant
facts are "determinable" and whether Congress or the agency has made
any risk assessment; whether the facts adduced meet the adjusted level
of proof; and whether the policy choice can rationally rest on that
factual base. The degree of factual support necessary should be recog-
nized as varying directly with the determinability of the relevant data,
and inversely with the societal risk addressed by the regulation. Wheth-
er denominated substantial evidence or arbitrary and capricious review,
66. However, in Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 417 U.S. 283, 331 (1974), the Court ap-
parently assumed that the widespread national concern about the energy crisis could
be viewed as readjusting the FPC's generalized responsibility of regulating in the
public interest. Because the Court's recognition of "society-wide" risk assessment con-
flicted neither with a specific risk assessment made by Congress in enacting the Natural
Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717(c), 717(d) (1970), nor with the implementing agency's assess-
ment, the Court's acceptance of a lower standard of factual proof may have been ap-
propriate. Such a holding would be suspect as a judicial amendment of a legislative
enactment, however, if a court recognized a social risk which conflicted with an earlier
specific congressional risk assessment, even if seemingly outdated.
67. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431
(1970); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970).
68. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-135 (k) (1970);
Flammable Fabrics Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1191-1204 (1970); Delaney Amendments of 1958,
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1970).
69. Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1970).
70. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970).
71. In enacting the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, the Congress
concluded that "safety shall be the overriding consideration in the issuance of standards."
S. REP. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966). See also the debate on the Clean Air Act
in regard to automobile emissions, note 76 infra.
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this flexible standard can assure reasoned decisionmaking across a
wide variety of dissimilar agency policy determinations.7 2
C. Application of the Sliding Scale Test
The need for a sliding scale test sensitive to congressional policy
ranking is illustrated in two decisions that did not use such a standard
of review. In International Harvester v. Ruckelshaus,73 the court
reviewed the Environmental Protection Agency's denial of suspension
of car emission standards for one year under the Clean Air Act.74 The
statutory conditions for suspension did not authorize EPA to give
weight to the economic costs of implementing the standards; suspen-
sion could be granted under the act only if control technology was
unavailable. The Harvester court, however, undertook an expansive
estimate of the economic burdens likely to result if the regulations
were put into effect while the technology was still imperfect. In slid-
ing scale terminology, the court held that its own estimate of an ad-
verse economic effect from emission standards justified requiring a
high level of factual support for a finding of technological avail-
ability.7 5 In so doing, the court ignored Congress's decision to al-
leviate the risk to health70 (which should permit a lower standard
of proof based on predictions) and Congress's unwillingness to give
the implementing agency or the courts any power to reach a different
policy accommodation between considerations of cost and public
health.
77
72. Any extension of the sliding scale approach to adjudication and formal rulemaking
would turn on whether Congress's specification of relatively formal procedures is to be
read as also requiring an unvarying high degree of factual certainty to justify agency
action.
If formality of procedure does correlate with formality of proof, the sliding scale
standard would be applicable to nonformalized decisionmaking. The wide policy discre-
tion typically conferred upon agencies under regulatory acts using nonformalized decision-
making might allow action based on "uncertain" factual data to be upheld in any
event. See note 22 supra.
73. 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 1857 f-l(b) (1970).
75. 478 F.2d at 636-41.
76. The sponsors of the Clean Air Act repeatedly stated that Congress was making
a policy decision on public health grounds regardless of economic consequences. See,
e.g., 116 CONG. REc. 32901-04 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Muskie):
The first responsibility of Congress is not the making of technological or economic
judgments-or even to be limited by what is or appears to be technologically or
economically feasible. Our responsibility is to establish what the public interest
requires to protect the health of persons.
Id. at 32901-02.
77. In effect the Harvester court construed the statute as establishing the real dead-
line for emission control as 1976, not 1975. That construction is not required by the
statute or its legislative history; indeed, both suggest the opposite result. For example,
even the broadest suspension condition, allowing the EPA administrator to consider the
public interest, provides that the suspension be "essential to the public interest." It is
difficult to read such a directive as permitting any easy reevaluation of the original
congressional policy decision in favor of a 1975 deadline. 42 U.S.C. § 1857 f-l(b) (1970).
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Ethyl Corp. v. EPA78 reviewed regulations under the Clean Air Act
for the phased reduction of the lead content of motor vehicle gasoline.
In the first opinion in the case (subsequently vacated upon rehearing
en banc), a panel of the D.C. Circuit interpreted the EPA administra-
tor's statutory authority to control the manufacture and sale of motor
vehicle fuel or additives "if any emissions products of such fuel or fuel
additives will endanger the public health or welfare. ' 79 The factual
basis for regulating lead in fuel was some showing that lead emitted
from cars could be inhaled or ingested with effect on blood lead levels.
Examining the legislative history, comparing the "will endanger" stand-
ard to other regulatory standards in the act, and treating the phrase
"as a matter of plain English meaning,"s the court concluded that
the "will endanger" standard required a present ability to demonstrate
actual present harm to health from exposure to lead emissions from
auto fuel rather than a prediction of harm."' The court rejected the
inferences drawn by the agency as to risk on the ground that no single
study could conclusively demonstrate that lead emissions caused a
sufficient health hazard to a significant portion of the population.
2
The statutory directive to consider all relevant medical and scien-
tific evidence available in fact set no minimum on the level of scien-
78. 7 ENVIRON. REP. CAS. 1353 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 28, 1975), vacated on order granting re-
hearing en banc, No. 73-2205 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 17, 1975), reheard en banc (D.C. Cir. May
30, 1975).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1857 f-6c(c)(1) (1970) (emphasis added).
80. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 7 ENvIRON. REP. CAS. 1353, 1361 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 28, 1975).
81. Id. at 1357. The Ethyl court's discussion is often contradictory; it approves the
agency's assertion that meeting the "will endanger" standard depends on the cumulative
effect of exposure to auto emissions and all other sources of lead. Yet the court then
insists that the health hazard must be traced to auto emissions alone, requiring a
"measureable increment of lead [that] . . . causes a significant health hazard." Id.
(emphasis omitted).
82. The EPA offered as evidence a controlled diet and air exposure study indicating
that inhaled lead did result in higher blood lead levels, and other studies showing
statistical correlations between emission exposure and blood levels. The Ethyl majority
nonetheless rejected the factual conclusions drawn by the agency, because the studies
were based on correlations, were limited to a few subjects, or did not isolate the impact
of auto emissions from the effect of dietary ingestion of lead. The majority failed to
recognize the cumulative character of scientific evidence. Id. at 1369-73. See id. at 1403-
13 (dissenting opinion by Wright, J., giving an extensive review of weaknesses in the
scientific analysis underlying the majority opinion).
Ethyl was reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard. Id. at 1367. Yet even
by the traditional interpretation of the substantial evidence standard, the majority in
Ethyl clearly exceeded the proper scope of review. The Ethyl majority repeatedly drew
inferences in conflict with EPA, and then rejected EPA's inferences without evaluating
whether they were rational as well.
The majority relied on Overton Park's statement that review under the "arbitrary
and capricious' standard requires determination of whether there has been a "clear
error of judgment." Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 7 ENVIRON. REP. CAS. 1353, 1367 (D.C. Cir.
Jan. 28, 1975), citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971);
see p. 1754 supra. Judge Wright's dissent correctly points out that Overton's "clear
error of judgment" 'language is confusingly similar to the "clearly erroneous" standard
used by an appellate court in review of a lower court. The similarity in language may
tempt an appellate court to review agency determinations as rigorously as it would
those of lower courts. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, supra at 1400-01 n.57, 1402 n.63.
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tific certainty required before the agency could act. Under the sliding
scale standard, the impossibility of certainty in identifying the effect
of a pollutant on health would by itself rationalize reducing the level
of proof required of the EPA; the level of required certainty should
have been even lower given the congressional decision to protect pub-
lic health.
Conclusion
Congressional and agency policymaking, and judicial review of that
process, have converged most uneasily in the area of complex tech-
nical decisionmaking.
In factual review of informal rulemaking under the Administrative
Procedure Act, Supreme Court decisions in Overton Park, Allegheny-
Ludlum, and Midwest Video suggest that the substantial evidence
standard applies. A clear holding that substantial evidence is the re-
quired standard would held to ensure that judicial scrutiny of in-
formal rulemaking is sufficiently searching.
A reviewing standard that explicitly recognizes flexibility in fac-
tual review has also become essential. This Note proposes a "sliding
scale" test, varying the required degree of factual support according
to the availability of relevant data and the societal risks the regula-
tion alleviates, as gauged by the Congress or the implementing agency.
A flexible standard of factual review would avoid the excessively harsh
review seen in Harvester and Ethyl, which can frustrate congressional
provision for control of technology and protection of health.
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